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____________ 
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____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00035-002) 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 17, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 John L. Chaffo, Jr. (“Chaffo”) appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence for 
wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 
1349.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 On July 14, 2009, a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a 
Superseding Indictment charging Chaffo with eleven counts of wire fraud and two counts 
of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  The following facts were elicited at trial, which 
began on June 22, 2010. 
From 2004 to 2007, Michael Dokmanovich, a mortgage broker, worked with John 
Orth, Bernardo Katz, and Daniel Smithbower to orchestrate a series of “no-money-down” 
real estate transactions with subprime borrowers.  The transactions were designed to 
induce lenders to loan funds to subprime borrowers, and to provide excess funds above 
and beyond what true property values and borrower profiles warranted, through a series 
of false representations in sales agreements and loan applications.  The false 
representations included, inter alia, artificially inflated property appraisals, sales prices 
and borrowers‟ incomes, as well as down payments and second mortgages which did not 
actually exist.  The down payments and second mortgages played a particularly critical 
role in convincing lenders that borrowers had “skin in the game” and were less likely to 
default, thereby inducing the decision to extend loans.  After a deal had been closed, 
Dokmanovich would receive fees, sellers would receive payment, and buyers would 
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receive cash back based on the inflated sales prices and loans.  Throughout this period, 
Dokmanovich worked as the broker, while Orth, Katz, and Smithbower all sold 
properties; a number of buyers, including Smithbower, were involved. 
Chaffo served as the closing attorney for fifty-nine of the sixty deals orchestrated 
by Dokmanovich.  Chaffo had twenty-three years of experience providing services as a 
closing attorney for over seven thousand real estate transactions.  Chaffo‟s 
responsibilities as closing attorney included overseeing the signing of all closing 
documents and completing a HUD-1 Settlement Statement (“HUD-1”) setting forth the 
terms of each transaction.  On each HUD-1 Chaffo signed, he acknowledged that “The 
HUD-1 Settlement Statement which I have prepared is a true and accurate account of this 
transaction.  I have caused the funds to be disbursed in accordance with this statement.”  
Lenders relied on the HUD-1s to verify the accuracy of corresponding loan applications 
and sales agreements, to determine whether to make a loan and for how much, and to 
certify that loans were properly disbursed. 
 All closings took place in Chaffo‟s office.  Chaffo oversaw the false representation 
of down payments and second mortgages, often instructing participants on how to 
proceed.  He personally copied checks that represented down payments in order to show 
them to lenders, but then returned the checks for borrowers to destroy.  In his capacity as 
closing attorney, Chaffo also distributed funds after loans were received in accordance 
with the reality of a transaction, rather than as represented on the HUD-1s, sales 
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agreements, and loan applications.  Nonetheless, Chaffo signed off on all of the 
settlement documents and HUD-1s which stated otherwise, and reassured buyers when 
they became suspicious.  For his work, Chaffo was paid his normal rates and fees. 
Based on their roles in the Dokmanovich deals, Smithbower and Orth pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy charges and testified for the Government at Chaffo‟s trial.  
Dokmanovich also pleaded guilty, but did not testify for either side.  The Government put 
on a total of eighteen witnesses, including Patricia Lindsey, a real estate underwriting and 
mortgage fraud expert.  On July 6, 2010, Chaffo was convicted on all but two counts of 
wire fraud, and sentenced to fifty-seven months‟ imprisonment, followed by a three-year 
term of supervised release.  Chaffo timely appeals. 
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Chaffo alleges four grounds for overturning his conviction, which we address in 
turn: the use of co-conspirators‟ guilty pleas as substantive evidence of his guilt; the 
admission of opinion testimony by Government witnesses as unhelpful to the jury; 
sufficiency of the evidence; and the District Court‟s failure to instruct the jury on the 
scope and meaning of “honest services fraud” under 28 U.S.C. § 1346. 
 We normally review a district court‟s decision regarding the admissibility of 
evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d 
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Cir. 2000).   On such grounds, a “non-constitutional error at trial does not warrant 
reversal where „it is highly probably that the error did not contribute to the judgment.‟”  
United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States 
v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000)).  To the extent that a ruling was based on 
an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, our review is plenary.  Id. at 271. 
 However, where the defendant failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection, we 
review for plain error.  United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Additionally, where, as here, the defendant failed to preserve a sufficiency of the 
evidence objection, we will reverse on such grounds only for plain error.  United States v. 
Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 2011).  When reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence for plain error, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 657 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
III. 
 Chaffo‟s first challenge raises the issue of whether Smithbower‟s and Orth‟s guilty 
pleas were improperly used to prove his guilt.  “We have repeatedly held that the 
government may [not] introduce a witness‟s guilty plea . . . as substantive evidence of a 
defendant‟s guilt.”  United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 
668 (3d Cir. 2000).  However, a witness‟s guilty plea is admissible for other purposes, 
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such as informing the jury‟s assessment of witness credibility and bias, rebutting any 
notions of selective prosecution, or substantiating a witness‟s personal knowledge of the 
“defendant‟s misdeeds,” United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1994), so 
long as any lingering “prejudicial effect” is “cured through a curative instruction to the 
jury.”  Universal Rehab., 205 F.3d at 668.  When a proper curative instruction has been 
issued, we do not ascribe a prejudicial understanding to the jury if doing so would require 
jurors to “possess an unlikely combination of shrewdness (to invent the argument) and 
obtuseness (to ignore the obvious meaning of the instruction).”  United States v. Rivas, 
493 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Although it is far from clear that Chaffo objected to the contested use of these 
guilty pleas, we need not determine whether Chaffo properly preserved the issue because, 
even under an abuse of discretion standard, the jury instructions were sufficient to cure 
any prejudicial effect.  The District Court specifically instructed the jury that although it 
had “heard evidence from certain witnesses who pled guilty to charges arising from 
events that are the subject of this trial,” it “must not consider their guilty pleas as any 
evidence of Mr. Chaffo’s guilt.”  The Court went on to instruct that jury that it could 
“only consider the guilty pleas for credibility purposes, to eliminate any concern that Mr. 
Chaffo has been singled out for prosecution,” and “to explain how the witness came to 
possess detailed, first-hand knowledge of the events.”  These instructions were clear and 
unequivocal; to ignore them, the jury would need to possess both the “shrewdness” and 
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“obtuseness” which we decline to attribute to it.  See Rivas, 493 F.3d at 138; United 
States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (3d Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, even assuming 
that Chaffo preserved his objections, it is highly probable that the challenged testimony 
did not contribute to the judgment.  See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 265-66. 
 Chaffo‟s second argument challenges the testimony of Government witnesses 
Lindsey and Orth as unhelpful to the jury.  Chaffo preserved his objection to Lindsey‟s 
testimony, so we review the challenged statement for abuse of discretion.  See 
Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 249.  However, Chaffo failed to object contemporaneously to 
Orth‟s testimony,1 and therefore plain error review is appropriate.  See id. 
 First, we will address the challenge to Lindsey‟s expert testimony under Rule 702 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2
  Rule 702 provides the threshold requirements for 
admission of expert testimony, including that the expert‟s “specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.”  Fed. R. 
                                              
1Although the Government concedes that Chaffo objected to Orth‟s testimony, we 
note that the objection rested on different grounds from that which he asserts on appeal, 
making plain error review the proper standard.  See United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 
238, 264 n.31 (3d Cir. 2010). 
2Chaffo‟s argument also sounds in Federal Rule of Evidence 704‟s treatment of 
testimony on an “ultimate issue,” but since Chaffo insists that we focus solely on 
helpfulness under Rule 702, we do not discuss that aspect of the testimony.  Nonetheless, 
we note that accepting his argument would be inconsistent with our “liberal policy of 
admissibility,” United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 173 (3d Cir. 2010), and would revert 
to the superficial constraints of the “ultimate issue” regime.  See Fed. R. Evid. 704 
advisory committee‟s note. 
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Evid. 702.  We have always allowed expert testimony which assists the trier of fact in 
understanding complex transactions that lie outside “the common knowledge of the 
average juror.”  United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2001); see 
Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 269-70.  That such testimony might sound like legal terminology 
does not diminish its helpfulness, unless it simply offers legal conclusions in the form of 
an opinion.  See id. at 270 (citing United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988)); 
Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory committee‟s note (“Rules 701 and 702 . . . afford ample 
assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result 
to reach . . . .  They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately 
explored legal criteria.  Thus the question, „Did T have capacity to make a will?‟ would 
be excluded, while the question, „Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the 
nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a 
rational scheme of distribution?‟ would be allowed.”). 
 It is difficult to comprehend how Lindsey‟s testimony was unhelpful in this case, 
because complex mortgage transactions lie well beyond the common experience of the 
average juror.  Perhaps in recognition of this, Chaffo relies on a single exchange, where 
the Government asked Lindsey whether, “based on what [she knew], [wa]s what [she 
had] seen consistent with misrepresentation by a closing agent in a settlement 
transaction.”  Lindsey responded that, “based on the information [she] was given, there 
was misrepresentation in order to lead or induce the lender to close these transactions.”  
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Citing United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988), Chaffo asserts that this was not 
helpful because “misrepresentation” is similar to the “false representation” terminology 
used in the wire fraud statute.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  In Scop, the Second Circuit found 
that a Securities and Exchange Commission investigator‟s testimony violated Rule 702 
because his repeated use of terms such as “scheme to defraud” embodied legal 
conclusions, thereby usurping – rather than aiding – the jury.  846 F.2d at 139-40.  Chaffo 
similarly attempts to characterize the term “misrepresentation” as a legal conclusion. 
We do not find his argument persuasive.  Scop has no bearing where the 
challenged testimony was isolated and not couched in the language of the criminal 
statute.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(distinguishing Scop and finding testimony helpful where calling program a “scam” was 
not legal opinion or couched in statutory language); United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 
101-02 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Scop and finding testimony helpful where, though 
it “came close to tracking the object of one of the charged conspiracies,” it was a single 
occurrence and did not repeat exact statutory language).  The challenge here boils down 
to a single word of Lindsey‟s lengthy testimony which, though reminiscent of statutory 
language, was not couched in it, and therefore falls far short of usurping the jury‟s role.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Lindsey‟s statement did not fall outside of Rule 702‟s 
requirements and, in any event, constitutes harmless error in light of the 
comprehensiveness of her remaining testimony. 
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 Co-conspirator Orth testified that Chaffo was “part of the scheme.”  Chaffo now 
asserts that this constituted unhelpful lay testimony, in violation of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 701.  Like Rule 702, Rule 701 provides a threshold requirement for lay opinion 
testimony, which must be “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness‟ testimony or 
the determination of a fact in issue.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701(b).  A lay witness may not offer 
an opinion of the defendant‟s subjective state of mind where the jury is equally capable 
of making such an inference.  Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 250-51.  However, if such testimony 
is not a “lay opinion,” id. at 249, or helps the jury to understand the witness‟s own 
testimony, then Rule 701 is not implicated.  Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 265. 
 Orth‟s testimony toes the line.  Although the Government contends that Orth did 
not offer an opinion, his statement that Chaffo “was part of the scheme” could entail a 
judgment as to Chaffo‟s subjective belief and intent regarding the Dokmanovich 
transactions.  However, we need not decide whether Rule 701 is implicated because, even 
assuming that it is, admission of his statement does not constitute “egregious error or a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.”  Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 249 (internal marks and citations 
omitted).  In light of the “mountain of circumstantial evidence” offered by both Orth and 
seventeen other Government witnesses, see id. at 251, there was overwhelming evidence 
from which the jury could establish Chaffo‟s knowledge of and participation in the 
conspiracy.  Accordingly, we find no plain error. 
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 Chaffo next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction 
on the grounds that the Government failed to prove that he knew of and willfully 
participated in the fraudulent scheme, as is required for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  
See United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 541 (3d Cir. 1976).  Although independent 
misrepresentations by an individual defendant will not alone establish knowledge of and 
intent to participate in a broader scheme to defraud, see id. at 541, jurors may infer such 
knowledge and intent from circumstantial evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 621 
F.3d 312, 333 (3d Cir. 2010).  Moreover, “[t]here is no requirement . . . that the inference 
drawn by the jury be the only inference possible or that the government‟s evidence 
foreclose every possible innocent explanation.”  United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 97 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1992).  Chaffo failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of trial, 
so we review for plain error.  United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 The evidence amply supports the jury‟s finding of the requisite knowledge and 
intent.  The Government presented eighteen witnesses who described the scheme and 
Chaffo‟s role in it, from which the jury learned that Chaffo bore responsibility for the 
HUD-1 statements sent to lenders before closing in order to obtain financing for the 
fraudulent deals.  Upon Chaffo‟s instruction and approval, these statements made 
fraudulent representations that induced lenders to loan more money than warranted by 
true property values.  The evidence showed that Chaffo knew that the required down 
payments had not been made and that second mortgages had not been obtained, even 
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though the HUD-1s indicated otherwise.  Further, unlike the independent 
misrepresentations at issue in Pearlstein, where the defendants‟ statements had no ties to 
the alleged conspiracy, 576 F.2d at 541, Chaffo was intricately involved in the deals at 
issue here, and effectively instructed his co-conspirators on how best to induce the 
lenders to approve the loans.  And based on the repeated misrepresentations and deals 
made in the two schemes, the jury could conclude that this was not a simple oversight or 
mistake, but rather a calculated and deliberate decision to participate.  The jury could 
therefore infer Chaffo‟s knowledge of and intent to participate in the scheme, and he has 
not met his “very heavy burden” in persuading us otherwise.  United States v. Kellogg, 
510 F.3d 188, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 In a final foray, which he makes pro se, Chaffo argues that his conviction rested 
on 28 U.S.C. § 1346, and consequently, the District Court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury as to the scope and meaning of honest services fraud.  See United States v. Turcks, 
41 F.3d 893, 898 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing proposition that “the possibility that the jury 
rested its general verdict on the one improper theory among multiple proper theories 
requires reversal”).  Chaffo failed to object on these grounds at trial, so we review for 
plain error.  See Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 249.  Even construing his supplemental brief as 
liberally as possible, we find this contention to be meritless.  First, Chaffo was indicted, 
tried and convicted solely under the wire fraud statute, and therefore his assertion that the 
jury may have relied on an alternative theory of guilt is simply not supported by the 
  
13 
record.  See United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 655 (3d Cir. 2006).  Second, Chaffo 
mistakenly assumes that the Government‟s mention of fiduciary duties converts the 
object of his fraud from money or property, as is required under § 1343, to honest 
services.  However, the Government based its case on the funds Chaffo received via wire 
transfers in connection with the property sales at issue and the financial losses of the 
victims.  Therefore, Chaffo‟s argument must be rejected. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
